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American Militarism

General David M. Shoup, former Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, has set forth his views on "The New American Militarism" in the April issue of the *Atlantic*. His statement, somewhat reminiscent of the warning sounded by President Eisenhower against the power of the Military-Industry Combine and coming as it does at the peak of the ABM debates, has stirred up considerable comment. Shoup's message is that "the cult of the gun" is ready to lead us into war whenever and wherever the cultists "suspect Communist aggression." The obvious index of the military's ballooning influence is, of course, the Defense budget itself - \$45.5 billion in 1960, when General Shoup became Marine Corps Commandant; over \$82 billion ten years later. But the momentous meaning of Shoup's essay lies elsewhere, in what he does not say, in what he did not know how to say, in what he seems not to have observed.

General Shoup, who retired in December 1963 as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, never made the New Team that has been riding high this decade. With his Congressional Medal of Honor and his quiet dignity he was one of the old school. Like the other Chiefs of Staff of his time - Lemnitzer, White, Burke and Decker - he was battle-trained, competent, old-line. His and their era came to an end with the change of Administration in 1961, and specifically with the abortive invasion of Cuba. Shoup was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the Bay of Pigs, as was General Lemnitzer, but they never participated in its planning. The invasion cast the peacetime military forces in a role for which they were unprepared. When it misfired, some believed, or hoped, that CIA-directed paramilitary operations would be shelved, that a lesson had been learned and firm restraints placed on the gung-ho enthusiasts for counter-insurgency. They were wrong. In the wake of the disaster, President Kennedy appointed a review board (Allen Dulles, Admiral Burke, Robert Kennedy, and Maxwell Taylor). General Taylor, who had left the Army to vent his displeasure with things as they were and to write *The Uncertain Trumpet*, here found an outlet for his energies. When the Bay of Pigs hearings were concluded, President Kennedy made Taylor his Special Assistant and Adviser for Military matters. Both the young President and the ambitious general denied that this assignment would infringe upon the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But the insiders knew better, knew General Taylor, knew he was more a CIA-type operator than an old-school military man. At Fort Bragg's Special Forces Center and in the new Air Cavalry Mobile Divisions at Fort Benning, the new forces began to be formed.

From his position close to the throne, General Taylor rapidly cemented relations between the CIA and elements of the Army. General Marshall S. Carter (Army) replaced General Charles B. Cabell (Air Force) as deputy director, Central Intelligence. John McCone replaced the old master, Allen Dulles, as director. The Army was drastically reoriented: "Green Berets" and

CIA officials were serving in the Defense Department in both military and civilian roles. General Taylor over as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lemnitzer having completed his tour. The man who stepped down from the Army in a huff was back, bigger than life and in the number one job. The Army CIA example spread like wildfire. The Air Force rushed to create its own Special Air Warfare units from assorted remnants of the Bay of Pigs resour. The Navy created its own version of Special Warfare units in its SEAL teams and others. With General Taylor it was "Get on the Team" or get left behind. The new President and his brother had embraced the concept of counterinsurgency; the New Team was ready to meet the challenge.

General Shoup and the Marines were not on the team. Although the regular military forces had highest regard for the Marines as experts in Special Warfare, the Army-CIA enthusiasts passed them by. The emerging team prided itself on its readiness to perform anywhere in the world, "wherever and whenever we suspect Communist aggression," as General Shoup says. To repeat, the vital force in the new militarism was not the traditional military. It was not the man who spearheaded the "massive and swift invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965," to which Shoup refers in his *Atlantic* article. It was the CIA-Special Forces elements which opened the door, and were followed by the regular military, after basic decisions had been made. Even the Marine colonel who opened early contacts with Dominican officials in Washington and later in the Dominican Republic, was working with and through the CIA representatives, not with the military.

CIA, as used in this connection, is the operational organization, not the intelligence structure, and its operational organization was and is well-placed throughout the government. Farsighted Army officers years ago saw the value of travelling the CIA road for contacts, special techniques, and the mystique that went with working in the backrooms of military activities. Lt. Gen. William E. De Puy, assistant chief of staff, first served with CIA as a deputy division chief in 1950 and 1951; Lt. Gen. W. Raymond Peers was chief of CIA clandestine training in 1950 and the head of Western Enterprises, a CIA cover operation in Taiwan from 1951 through 1953. Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy started out in CIA on the intelligence side, wandered over to Defense, then to State where his specialized training was put to use.

Air Cavalry units ascended to prominence over conventional forces. A large number of US Army Special Forces officers were on special assignment with the CIA, or had had assignments with that agency. Many Robert Komer went from CIA to the White House as an Ambassador in charge of "pacification." The decision makers on the New Team took